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630 PEOPLE v. GAINES [58 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 7007. In Bank. Oct. 25, 1962.J 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHANIEL 
GAINES, Defendant and Appellant. 
{l] Criminal Law - Plea - Withdrawal. - Defendant's attorney 
properly exercised his discretion in withdrawing defendant's 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of murder 
where two of three appointed psychiatrists concluded that de-
fendant was legally sane when the crillle was committed and 
the third expert, though disagreeing with the conclusion of 
the other two, concluded that he was unnble to determine with 
any degree of certainty what defendant's mental status really 
was at the time the crime was committed. 
[2] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-That defense coun-
sel in a murder prosecution decided not to bring before the 
jury on the main trial the testimony of a psychiatrist to at-
tempt to negate defendant's ability to form specific intent 
but instead saved the point and exerted it as forcefully as 
possible on the penalty trial before the same jury did not deny 
defendant the effective aid of counsel. 
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CJunsel.-Defendant's claim 
that his trial counsel was guilty of an almost total resignation 
from his responsibility to conduct a defense for defendant 
was without merit where defendant did not suggest any addi-
tional questions that could have been asked or any witnesses 
who could have been called in his behalf, and where the record 
showed an adequate examination by defendant's trial counsel 
of the witnesses called by the prosecution. 
[4] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a murder prose-
cution in which defendant's identification was positive, the 
description of the commission of the crime was clear, and the 
murder weapon was traced to defe.ndllnt and was discovered 
hidden in his home, defense counsel's waiver of argument on 
the main trial was not a resignation from his responsibility 
to conduct a defe.nse for defendant where counsel decided that 
to make an argument with no reasonable possibility of success 
on the main trial would lessen the impact of his argument on 
[1] See 0a1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 258 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
innl Law (1st ed § 289). 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 e.t seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
innl Law (1st ed § 167 et seq). 
McK. Dill'. References: [1, 6J Criminal Ln,v, § 218; [2-5] Crim-
inal Law, § 107; [7J Criminal Law, § 632; [8] Criminal Law, § 608; 
[9,10] Criminal Law, § 1010. 
) 
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the penalty phase :md where couns!'} al"g"ued the matter fully 
and completely on that phase of the case. 
[5] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a lllurder prose-
cution, defendant was not d!'nied the effective aid of counsel 
by reason of his lawyer's failure to offer specific evidence and 
instructions relating to the meaning and effect of a sentence of 
life imprisonlllent on the main trial where the subject was 
adequately covered during the. trial on the penalty phase of 
the case, where defendant's counsel presented his case as ex-
pertly as did counsel for defendant's codefendants, and where 
the trial techniques utilized by him gave defendant much mOI'e 
than the minimum requirements for a fair defense. 
[6] ld.-Plea-Withdra.wal.-Sincc. the statutes requiring that a 
defendant make his plea himself in open court (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1016-1018) relate only to the making of the plea and do not 
require that a withdrawal of it he. made by defendant per-
sonally, it was not error in a murder prosecution to allow de-
fendant's counsel to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity without defendant's being present. 
[7] ld.-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Pha.se of Case.-In a mur-
der prosecution, it was not error for the prosecutor to state 
to the jury in his closing argument that defendant, if given a 
life sentence, could be. paroled after serving seven years and 
to ask the jury to keep that in mind in determining the penalty. 
[8] ld.-Conduct of Counsel-Asking ImprDper Questions.-It was 
not misconduct for the prosecutor, during the penalty phase of 
a murder trial, to ask defendant and his codefendant whether 
or not defendant's wife was present when he. and his co-
defendant had certain conversations concerning the robbery 
of the store in which the homicide took place where no con-
versation between defendant :md his wife was ever elicited, 
and where the presence of the wife at a meeting with the hus-
band and other persons would void any possible confidentiality 
that might have existed had the husband and wife been alone 
together. 
[9] ld.-Judgment-Determination of Penalty-Hearing.-It is 
not error to permit the prosecution to give the opening and 
elosing arguments to the jury on the penalty phase of a murder 
trial. • 
[10] ld.-Judgment-Determination of Penalty-Verdict.-On the 
penalty phase of a murder prosecution involving three de-
fendants in which the jury had agreed on verdicts as to two 
defendants, it was proper for the court to formally take the 
verdicts on which the jury had agreed and then send the 
jurors back to deliberate on the penalty for the third de-
fendant who then had the right to, and did, waive further 
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APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. J. Howard Ziemann, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
William B. Wolfson, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As· 
sistant Attorney General, George J. Roth and Jack E. Goert· 
zen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judg· 
ment of guilty of murder in the first degree, pursuant to the 
provisions of section 1239, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code. 
The jury fixed the punishment at death. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the 
record discloses the following facts : 
Mr. and Mrs. Broxton operated a neighborhood grocery 
store. Between 7 :30 and 8 p. m. on November 26, 1960, Mrs. 
Broxton was in the storage room when she heard a voice say, 
"This is a stick.up. " She looked out into the main part of the 
store, where she saw defendant with a gun in his hand, another 
man wearing a blond wig and a mask, her husband, and Miss 
Withers, an employee of the store. 
, 
Defendant commanded Mrs. Broxton to come out, and after 
inquiring, "What is back there!" ordered her, Miss Withers 
and Mr. Broxton back to the storage room, saying, "No funny 
business. " Defendant followed them, and the other man 
went to the cash register. 
When they reached the back room, defendant told them to 
sit down. He then told Mr. Broxton to lie down on the floor. 
Mr. Broxton went down on his knees, and defendant directed 
him to lie in a certain way. Mr. Broxton started to say some· 
thing, and Mrs. Broxton said, "Don't, Honey. Do what he 
says." Defendant told them he was worried about Mr. Brox· 
ton, and Mr. Broxton lay down. 
Defendant then told Mrs. Broxton to lie down. She said: 
"I can't. I have arthritis in my knee. I can't lie down." 
He said: "All right, I am not afraid of you. I want this big 
boy." 
Mr. Broxton then straightened out on the floor. Defendant 
walked over, placed a gun two or three inches from his head, 
·Oet. ]962] PEOPLE v. GAINES 
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and shot him, with the result that Mr. Broxton died. De-
fendant removed a billfold from Mr. Broxton's hip pocket 
and walked out. 
Defendant was identified by Mrs. Broxton and Miss Withers. 
The gun which had been used had been taken out of pawn by 
defendant a few days previously and was later discovered 
under a water heater in his home. 
Defendant presents these questions: 
First. Was defendant ably defended by a deputy public 
defender of the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Officer 
Yes. Defendant contends that Mr. John Moore, a member 
of the staff of the Los Angeles County Public Defender's 
Office, ineptly handled the trial defense, with the result that 
he was denied the right of effective aid of counsel, and such 
aid as was rendered prejudiced the jury against him. 
An examination of the record discloses that this contention 
is devoid of merit. The lawyer representing defendant was 
experienced and well qualified. (See People v. Hughes, 57 
Ca1.2d 89, 99 [10] [17 Cal.Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33].) In the 
present case the record shows that there was no misconduct 
npon the part of defendant's attorney and that he ably repre-
sented defendant. 
[1] Defendant's specific contentions are: 
(a) That his attorney erred in withdrawing his plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity. 
Originally defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not 
guilty by reason of insanity. Two doctors were appointed, 
pursuant to section 1027 of the Penal Code, to examine de-
fendant as to his mental status. One of the doctors was fur-
ther appointed under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, with electroencephalogram testing authorized. On 
motion of defendant's counsel, a third doctor was appointed 
under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure" to conduct 
examination of the defendant as to his sanity at the time of 
the commission and presently." A fourth doctor was ap-
pointed "to conduct electroencephalogram tests ... sleep re-
cording and Metronal activation tests." 
The record reveals that "the electroencephalogram was 
normal, before, during and a~ter sleep and during, and after 
metrazol activation" and that no abnormality was recorded. 
Apparently two of the three appointed psychiatrists con-
cluded that defendant was legally sane when the crime was 
committed, for the third expert (Dr. McGinnis), in his report 
filed with the court, refers to their examination and inferen-
) 
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tially their conclusions, and states that he disagrees. Howcver, 
he concluded in his report that he was" unable to determine 
with any degree of eertainty, what the defendant's mental 
status then. . . really was." 'Vhen cross-examined on the 
witness stand, he testified: "Q. In other words, what you are 
saying is that now he doesn't remember? You are not saying 
at the time he didn't know what he was doing' You are not 
saying that, is that right? A. That is quite right, yes." 
With this information, defendant's eounsel withdrew the 
previous plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Clearly, under the record there was no reasonable prob-
ability of any jury's eoncluding that insanity existed in de-
fendant at the time of the commission of the crime, and there-
fore defense trial counsel properly exercised his discretion in 
withdrawing the plea. 
[2] (b) That defendant's counsel erred in not bringing 
before the jury on the main trial the testimony of Dr.Mc-
Ginnis to nega.te defendant's ability to form specific intent. 
This contention is obyiously not well founded, for defend-
ant's counsel was presented with a strategic problem in this 
regard: knowing that the main trial would be followed by a 
trial on the penalty by the same jury, should he take the 
ehance of antagonizing them by trying to foree an extremely 
weak theory of lack of intent, with the probable result that 
they would show no sympathy for his client when the penalty 
trial occurred, or should he save this point and then exert it 
as forcefully as possible (as the reeord indicates he actually 
did) on the penalty trial, where it might have some possible 
impact to sway the jury to leniency in their verdict on the 
penaltyt 
Competent lawyers in the same situation ,vould disagree on 
which course to take, depending on who they were, what their 
overall defense was, what their discussions with their client 
had elicited, and many other factors. Taking one view or the 
other would not deny the client the effeetive aid of counsel. 
[3] (c) That defendant's trial counsel was guilty of an al-
most total re'signati.on from his responsibility to conduct a 
defense for defendant, in that he fa.iled to (1) prQperly cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses, (2) call any witnesses in 
behalf of defendant, and (3) make an argument to the jury on 
the main trial. 
This contention is clearly without merit. Defendant's 
eounsel on appeal has not suggested any additional questions 
which could have been asked or any witnesses who could have 
Od. lUG~J ~)E()PLE t'. r..\!:--;ES 
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been called in Il,·Iclillant ';; b,·lHl]f. An examination of the 
record shows all adquatc examination of defendant's trial 
counsel of the witllcsses called by the prosecution. 
[4] Likewise, it would have been futile for defendant's 
counsel to have argued to the jury on the main trial of the 
case. Defendant's identification was positive, the description 
of the commission of the crime was clear, and the murder 
weapon was traced to defendant and was discovered hidden 
in his home. Defendant's trial counsel, aware of the impend-
ing penalty trial, properly reached a decision that to make an 
argument with no reasonable possibility of success on the 
main trial would lessen the impact of his argument on the 
penalty phase. He therefore waived argument on the main 
trial and argued the matter fully and completely on the 
penalty phase of the case. 
[5] (d) That defendant's counsel should have offered 
specific evidence and instructions rcZating to the meaning and 
effect of a sentence of life imprisomnent. 
This subject was adequately covered during the trial on the 
penalty phase of the case. Defendant's counsel presented his 
case as expertly as did counsel for each of the other two de-
fendants, and the trial techniques utilized by him gave de-
fendant much more than the minimum requirements for a fair 
defense. 
[6] Second. Was defendant's plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity properly withdrawn f 
Yes. The record discloses that defendant did not personally 
withdraw the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, but 
that the plea was withdrawn by his counsel. When the tran-
script on appeal was being prepared, the trial court's atten-
tion was directed to a discrepancy between the reporter's 
transcript and the clerk's transcript relating to the personal 
waiver of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The 
following occurred: "THE COURT: In that connection I would 
like the record to sho,,, that there were several doctors who 
had been appointed to examine the defendant and to advise the 
Court. There was Dr. Crahan and Dr. Abe, and as late a!'l 
May 5th, i>r. McGinnis and Dr. Alberto Mariacci had exam-
ined the defendant and reported to both ('ounsel and to the 
Court. I think it was on the basis of those reports which 
were made a part of the record here, that ('onnspl withdrew 
the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. MR. LENOIR: I 
am not disputing with the Court in that regard. The only 
thing I am asking is that the Clerk's transcript should be the 
) 
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!;<une as the reporters' transcript, whk·It I think correctly re-
flects the proceedings had on this matter. TIlE COURT: Very 
wcll. I will order the Clerk's transcript to be corrected to 
~how that the. defendant did not personally withdraw the plea 
or not guilty by reason of insanity, but that that was done by 
II is counsel.' t . ~ 
It is clear that a criminal defendant's plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity must be made by the defendant him,sel/ 
ill open court. Section 1016 of the Penal Code provides that 
there are "five kinds of pleas" to an indictment, information, 
01' complaint, and the fifth enumerated plea is "Not guilty 
by reason of insanity." Section 1017 sets forth the proper 
form for each of these five pleas, and the immediately follow-
ing section, 1018, flatly directs that unless otherwise provided 
by law, "every plea" lUust be put ill by "the defendant him-
self in open court." 
The code sections, however, relate only to the making of the 
Illea; they do not require that a withdrawal of it be made by 
the defendant personally, and we should not read such a re-
quirement into the statutes. In the absence of a statute re-
quiring that the withdrawal of a plea of "not guilty by reason 
. of insanity" be made by a defendant himself. or the presence 
of some compelling circumstance not shown here, we should not 
depart from the customary practice by which an attorney 
acts for his client throughout the trial. 
'1'he fact that section 1018 refers only to the making of pleas 
may have led many attorneys and judges to believe that pl('as 
eould properly be withdrawn by the attorney, and under these 
circumstances it would seem improper to reverse convictions 
merely because such a procedure had been followed, and in 
the present case no claim is made by defendant that his at-
torney lacked authority to withdraw the plea. 
The case of PeopZe v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr. 
660, 363 P.2d 892]. is distinguishable on its facts. There 
the defendant pleaded not guilty and waived trial by jury, and 
thereafter hi, attorney and the prosecutor entered into a 
stipulation before the trial judge "that Your Honor will be 
restricted to either a finding of second degree murder or a 
finding of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter and that 
Your Honor would be precluded from a finding of first degree 
\ murder or a finding of not guilty under the circumstances." 
Since the quoted language specifically precluded the trial 
judge from finding the defendant not guilty, the stipulation 
necessarily amounted to a plp.a of guilty, in the alternative, to 
) 
) 
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one of the specific crimes refcrred to, the choice to be made by 
the judge after hearing the evidence. The stipulation, of 
course, involved the withdrawal of the prior plea of not guilty, 
but it also constituted the making of a plea of guilty, and this 
fact brought it directly within the language of section 1018. 
Since the guilty plea was not made by the defendant hirnself, 
we reversed the judgment. 
In the present case it was not necessary for defendant him-
self to request a withdrawal of the plea of "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" in order to remove that issue from the case, 
and the trial court did not err in permitting the withdrawal 
of the plea to be made by defendant's attorney. 
[7] Third. Did the prosecution commit prejudicial error 
in the trial of the case T 
No. Defendant contends that "the prosecutor blatantly 
misstated the law"; that it "would appear the prosecutor is 
going to ease the difficult path ahead of appellant if he is 
paroled after receiving sentence of life imprisonment by the 
simple expedient of executing him now"; and that the prose-
cutor's remarks relating to the effect of a sentence of life im-
prisonment gave the jury the impression that defendant, if so 
sentenced, "would be out in seven years. " 
On the contrary, the record indicates that the prosecution 
displayed rather unusual restraint in the presentation of its 
case in view of the brutal nature of the crime. 
Relative to the contention that the prosecuting attorney 
misled the jury as to the effect of life imprisonment, the 
record discloses that in his closing argument he stated: ". . . 
when and if these persons come before them [the Adult Au-
thority], they have the verdict of the jury that life is an ap-
propriate penalty-and life in California means they can be 
paroled and nobody says we are going to keep them for a 
thousand years any more than I would concede they are 
going to let them go after seven years. I never intended by 
my expressions to infer that as soon as the seventh year fell 
they automatically throw the gates wide open. All I mean 
to say is that is a fact that they may be paroled from prison, 
and I ask you to take that in mind in determining ... the 
penalty. ' , ~ 
An examination of the record discloses that various other 
remarks of the prosccution which defendant admits are not 
individually prejudicial were not collectively so, and there-
fore under article VI, section 41/z, of the Constitution would 
not warrant a reversal of the judgment. 
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[8] Fourth. Did qucstions addressed to defendant and his 
codefcndants relative to whether dcfcndant's wife was presc1lt 
at a mceting with them constitute prejudicial error? 
No. Defendant complains of certain questioning by the pros-
ecution on the penalty phase of the trial relating to whether or 
not his wife was present when he and his codefendants had 
certain conversations concerning the robbery of the Broxtons' 
store. 
No conversation between defendant and his wife was ever 
elicited. In addition, the presence of the wife at a meeting 
with the husband and other persons would void any possible 
confidentiality which might have existed had the husband and 
the wife been alone together. (McCormick, Evidence (1954) 
§ 84, p. 172.) 
[ 9] Fifth. Did the trial COUt·t commit prejudicial error in 
permitting the prosecution to givc the opening and closing 
arguments to the jury em the penalty phase? 
No. (People v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404, 407 [2] [340 P.2d 
626] ; cf. People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884 [346 P.2d 22].) 
[10] Sixth. Did the trial COUt·t err by taking verdicts in 
regard to only two of the defendants on the penalty phase' 
No. Defendant contends that the court committed error in 
taking the case from the jury on the penalty phase of their 
deliberations. The record shows that the jury retired for 
deliberations on this phase of the case on Wednesday, May 24, 
1961. On Friday morning, May 26, 1961, they returned to the 
courtroom at 11 :10 a. m. to have read to them the testimony 
of defendant Rollins (a codefendant) and his wife. At 11 :55 
a. m. the jury retired for further deliberations. 
At 3 :43 p. m. the court called the jury back into the court-
room, and the following proceedings occurred: "THE COURT: 
Let the record show that the three defendants and theirrespec-
tive counsel are present, and that the members of the jury and 
the alternates are in their proper places in the jury box. Mr. 
Foreman, my inquiry is not in the nature of one trying to 
hasten or push you, but it is simply one of inquiry. Have you 
been able to reach any verdicts yet T MR. SCURR: Yes, your 
Honor. Tim COURT: As to one or all of the defendants T MR. 
SCURR: As to two of the defendants. THE COURT: Would you 
hand those verdicts to the bailiff, please T MR. SCURR: I did not 
bring those verdicts with me. As yet, they are not signed. THE 
COURT : Well, they are not verdicts then. MR. SCURR: W (' 
reached our final decision on them, but they were not signed 
because it was our understanding we sign them all at once. 
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THE COURT: Let me iuC}uire as to the remaining defendant, 
do you think you can reach a verdict 1 MR. SCURR: Yes, your 
Honor, I pt'rsonally do. THE COURT: Shortly, or over the week-
end' MR. SCURR: '.Vell, I think we can have a verdict tomor-
row, if you want it done. MR. LENOIR: May we approach the 
bench, your Honor' THE COURT: Yes, will counsel approach 
the bench, plcase." 
'rhe following proecl'uiugs were then had at the bench, 
outside the hearing of the jury: "Ma. LENOIR: I don't know 
what the procedure is, but when the foreman said ]le thought 
they could reach a verdiet as to the other defendant, one juror 
in the baek-I believe she is Number 10-she shook her head 
in a negative fashion. THE COURT: Mrs. Tisherman. MR. LE-
~OIR: Yes, your Honor, I made that observation, and I don't 
know what the procedure is. THE COURT: I would suggest 
we send them back anu let thcm sign the two verdicts, and 
then let them see what th('y ean do about the remaining on('. 
MR. HOWARD: That is perfectly agreeable to the People. THE 
COURT: Any objections? MR. MOORE: No objections. MR. 
LENOIR: No objections, your IIonor. MR. JEN"SEN: No objec-
tions. THE COURT: All right, I will so instruct them." 
The following proceedings then took place in open court, in 
the presence and hearing of the jury: "THE COURT : Would the 
jury please retire to the jury room and sign the verdicts on 
which you have agreed and then return to the Courtroom T 
All defendants and counsel may wait in the Courtroom until 
the jury returns." 
The jury left the courtroom at 3 :50 p. m. for further delib-
erations and returned at 3 ;55 p. m. 
The jury fixed defendant's penalty at death and cof1efend-
ant Barnes' penalty at life imprisonment. After the jr..ry was 
polled and these verdicts were recorded, the follow tug oc-
eurred: "THE COURT: Now, as to your verdict on the third 
defendant, Clifford Milton Rollins, do you still think :rou can 
reach a verdict after more deliberations ¥ MR. SCURR: Y,,g, your 
Honor. THE COURT: All right, the jury may retire for further 
deliberations. " 
The jury retired to the jury room at 4 :10 p. m. for further 
deliberations. Subsequently, the following transpired: "MR. 
JENSEN [Attorney for codefendant Rollins] : If it please the 
Court, the Court inquired whether we desired further deliber-
ations by the jury. THE COURT: That is correct. MR. JENSEN: 
I would like to ask the Court, does the Court mean that the 
) 
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jury ean be stopped from further deliberations' TBlI: COURT: 
At this time, there are two choices available to you. You can 
allow the jury to continue with their deliberations until they 
reach a verdict, or you can ask that it be taken from the jury 
on the ground that the jury . has not been able to reach a 
verdict. Ma. JENSEN: I would like the Court to declare the 
jury unable to reach a verdict. THE COURT: Then do you want 
another jury to fix the penalty, or do you want the Court to 1ix 
the penaltyf Ma. JENSEN: I want the Court to fix the penalty. 
THE COURT: You want me to fix it, then T Ma. JENSEN : Yes, 
that is our desire, your Honor. THE COURT: Is that what you 
want me to do, Mr. Rollins? DEFENDANT RoLLINS: Yes. THE 
COURT: Is there any opposition' MR. JACOBSON: No, your 
Honor, the People have no objection. THE COURT: Very well. 
Mr. Bailiff, bring the jury back in. " 
At 4:40 p. m., the members of the jury and the alternates 
returned to the courtroom, and the following proceedings were 
had in the presence and hearing of the jury: "THE COURT: 
Let the record show the defendant Rollins is present with his 
counsel, the Deputy District Attorneys are present, and the 
members of the jury and the alternates are all in their proper 
places in the jury box. On motion of defendant's counsel, I am 
going to dismiss the jury. I feel you have done a very good job 
up to now, and I doubt whether you will reach a decision 
within a convenient time, so I will dismiss the jury. I want to 
thank you for your verdicts, and as a matter of fact, you have 
arrived at exactly the same place I have arrived at." The 
court then fixed the penalty of defendant Rollins at life im-
prisonment. 
Section 1160 of the Penal Code provides, in part: "On a 
charge against two or more defendants jointly, if the jury 
cannot agree upon a verdict as to all, they may render a 
verdict as to the defendant or defendants in regard to whom 
they do agree, on which a judgment must be entered accord-
ingly. and the case as to the other may be tried again." 
Since the jury actually had agreed upon a verdict as to 
defendant, it was proper for the court to formally take the 
verdict and then send the jurors back to deliberate on the 
penalty for hiS codefendant Rollins. Likewise, defendant Rol-
lins had the right to waive further deliberations and leave 
his fate up to the trial judge. ' 
An examination of the record discloses that it is free from 
prejudicial error and that defendant had a fair trial, well 
) 
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represented by a competent attorney before an able and im-
partial trial judge. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was 
improperly withdrawn. Penal Code section 1018 unequivocally 
provides that "Unless otherwise provided by law every plea 
must be put in by the defendant himself in open court." Penal 
Code section 1016 enumerates the five pleas that may be 
entered, including" 5. Not guilty by reason of insanity." Read 
together these sections set forth a clear statutory procedure: 
unless otherwise provided by law, the pleas enumerated in 
section 1016 must be put in by the defendant himself in open 
court. The purpose of section 1018 is to ensure that the defend-
ant in a criminal action personally puts in issue the issues 
raised under any of the pleas included in section 1016. Since 
the withdrawal of a plea removes from litigation an issue that 
the defendant has personally put in issue, the withdrawal must 
also be by the defendant personally. Otherwise the issues to be 
litigated would not include those raised by defendant per-
sonally. Defendant had personally put his sanity in issue by 
his plea in open court of not guilty by reason of insanity. That 
issue remained in the case, for it was not personally withdrawn 
by defendant. Counsel's withdrawal of the plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity removed a legal excuse for the crime 
and was in effect a plea that" whereas before I pleaded that I 
did not do this act, but if I did, I am to be excused, now I 
plead that I did not do this act, but if I did, I have no excuse. " 
Such a plea was not defendant's own as section 1018 requires. 
In People v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 
P.2d 892), we reversed a judgment of conviction of murder 
in the second degree where, after defendant had personally 
pleaded not guilty pursuant to section 1018, counsel stipulated 
that the trial court be restricted to finding the defendant guilty 
of murder iJ} the secoud degree or of manslaughter and pre-
cluded from a finding of first degree murder or a finding of 
not guilty. We held that the stipulation violated section 1018 
"since it purported to eliminate from the trial the question 
of defendant's innocence." (56 Ca1.2d at 306.) Similarly, the 
withdrawal of defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity eliminated from the trial the question of his sanity 
• C.Jd-a1 
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at the time of the commission of the offense. If counsel may 
remove from litigation issues that the Legislature has directed 
must be personally put in issue by the defendant and that 
have been personally put in issue by him, the purpose of the 
statute is frustrated. 
There. is no merit in the contention that the plea of not 
. guilty by reason of insanity is not one that section 1018 
requires the defendant to make himself in open court since 
4' such plea is only an admission of commission of the acts 
charged, coupled with a denial of guilt ... resting upon the 
remaining defense of insanity." (People v. Pincus, 131 Cal. 
,App. 607, 610 [21 P.2d 964J.) That contention is contrary 
to the plain mandate of section 1018; nor does the Pincus case 
support it. That case involved the entry by the defendant's 
counsel of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity after the 
defendant had entered and withdrawn his plea of not guilty. 
Thus the defendant was not deprived of a trial on any issue 
that he had personally put in issue. Moreover, he personally 
waived a jury trial on the issue of insanity. On the facts of 
that case, the court correctly held that the plea "was really 
a plea by defendant himself, and that it did not result, by 
reason of the form in which it was made, in a miscarriage of 
justice, nor did it deprive defendant of any right ..• ~" (131 
Cal.,App. at p. 610.) 
It is immaterial that the plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity has been characterized as procedural rather than sub-
stantive for the purpose of determining whether the issue of 
sanity could be constitutionally determined in a separate trial. 
(See People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 44 [273 P. 767J ; People v. 
Leong F'ook, 206 Cal. 64, 74-75 [273 P. 779].) The question in 
the present case is whether that issue is to be determined at 
all, for the withdrawal of defendant's plea deprived him of 
the right to a jury trial on the issue of his sanity as guaran-
teed by Penal Code section 1026. Error that results in the 
deprivation of a basic right necessarily requires reversal to 
preclude prejudice to the judicial process and to the pro-
cedural.rights of a litigant even though there might be equally 
fair alternatives consonant with due process. (People v. 
Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301, 307 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892J ; 
People v. Holmes, 54 Cal.2d 442 [5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353P.2d 
583J; In re Brain, 70 Cal.,App. 334, 335 [233 P. 390].) 
In People v. Rogers, supra, we reversed the judgment even 
though counsel's improper withdrawal of the plea of not guilty 
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supra, we reversed the judgment on the ground that the 
defendant had not personally waived his right to a jury trial. 
"Experience has shown that there is sound reason for this 
requirement. If the waiver were left to implication from con-
duct, there would be a danger of misinterpretation with respect 
to a right the importance of which requires there be certainty. 
Moreover, appellate courts would be faced with the burden-
some task of determining whether the facts of the particular 
case warrant such an implication, whereas trial eourts, without 
any difficulty, can eliminate doubt and safeguard the rights 
of both the defendant and the People by obtaining express 
statements from the defendant, from his attorney, and from 
the prosecuting attorney not merely as to whether a trial by 
jury is desired but specifically that a jury is or is not waived. " 
(54 Ca1.2d at p. 444.) "Manifestly the entry of a plea in a 
prosecution for a felony cannot be said to be less important 
than the waiverof trial by jury." (People v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 
301, 307 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892].) 
It is immaterial that until the opinion in this case was filed, 
defendant made no claim "that his attorney lacked authority 
to withdraw the plea." In presenting his appeal, he was en-
titled to rely on the settled rule that a failure to comply with 
section 1018 requires reversal on appeal, for the very purpose 
of that section is to avoid uncertainties as to a defendant's 
intent in entering or withdrawing his plea. Moreover, now that 
the court has stated that such a claim is relevant, defendant 
has filed an affidavit that he did not authorize the withdrawal 
of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and that he be-
lieved at the time of the trial that the issue of sanity was being 
litigated during the trial on the issue of penalty.! His trial 
1"1. NA'l'BANII!:L GAINES, being first sworn, depose and say: 
II That in the trial of the above-entitled action, at no time was there 
any diseussion whatsoever had between myself and my attorney, JOHN 
MooRE, regarding the withdrawal of my plea of 'Not Guilty By Reason of 
Insanity'; that at no time, either befort', during or for some period of 
time after the conclusion of said trial was I ever aware that I was not to 
have and did not have a trial on the issue of my sanity at the time of the 
commission of the offense alleged as a result of said plea of 'Not Guilty 
By Reason of Insanity'; that at no time ever, did I or have I authorized, 
instrueted, suggested or acquiesced in the withdrawal of said plea of 
'Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity'; but thnt I, at nil times until the 
certification of the transcript on appeal, was under. the impression that 
I was to and did receive a trial on the issue of sanity at the time of the 
offense charged; that I was under the impression at all times until said 
certification that the penalty phase of my trial was in truth and fact the 
trial on the issue of sanity as raised by my plea of 'Not Guilty By 
Reason of Insanity' as well as the penalty phase should it be determined 
therein that I was sane at the time of the offense charged; that such 
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counsel has also filed an affidavit that he does not recall dis-
cussing the withdrawal of the plea with defendant. If defend-
ant did not authorize the withdrawal of the plea, he has berB 
denied the right to a jury trial on a vital issue in his ease, and 
habeas corpus will lie to determine whether the withdrawal of 
the plea was in fact authorized. (In re Martinez, 52 Cal.2d 80S, 
815 [345 P.2d 449].) The error in permitting defendant's 
counsrl to withdraw his plea should be corrected on appeal, 
however, and the problem of collateral attack on the judgment 
thereby obviated. 
There is no merit in the contention that the error was not 
prejudicial. In In re Brain, supra, the defendant's attorney 
had improperly entered a plea of guilty to a charge of bur-
glary. The court held that" [s]ection 4112 or article VI of 
the constitution could not be applied in the instant case even 
though we considered the error a procedural one, because of the 
absence of any record upon which we might judge of the guilt 
or innocence of the petitioner." (70 Cal.App. at p. 335.) Sim-
ilarly, the improper withdrawal of defendant's plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity in the present case has deprived 
this court of a record as to defendant's sanity from which to 
determine the effect of the error. How then can it reasonably 
be said that an examination of the entire record discloses that 
there has not been a miscarriage of justice, when a record on 
the crucial issue does not exist because of the withdrawal of 
defendant's plea f The only evidence bearing upon defend-
ant's competency at the time the offense was committed is 
that introduced in mitigation of the penalty under Penal Code 
section 190.1. To conclude from a review of this evidence that 
belief on my part was affirmed and justified by the presentation of medi· 
cal testimony concerning my sanity during the penalty hearing. 
"I further declare that until I received a copy of the transcript on 
appeal did I realize that I had not yet had a trial on my plea of 'Not 
Guilty By Reason of Insanity'; that I am a layman and completely 
unfamiliar with the proceedings leading up to and including trial, but 
that since my only defense to the crime charged was my complete 
inability to remember the acts with which I was charged, my only excuse 
would be insanity; that had I been informed that my plea of 'Not Guilty 
By Reason of Insanity' was to have been withdrawn, I would not have 
acquiesced in or approved of such withdrawal under any circumstances 
whntsoevar. 
"That this affidavit is executed for the purpose of setting out the true 
facts surrounding the withdrawal of the insanity plea in my ease as I 
know them, is true and correct and is made in support of a petition for 
rehearing following the decision in the above·entitled ease. 
lsI NATHANIEL GAINES 
N A 'l'IlANIlI:L G AINJ:S ' , 
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defendant could not sustain the burden of proving his insanity 
assumes that the evidence offered in mitigation of the penalty 
was necessarily identical with the evidence that would have 
been offered on a sanity hearing. Even if defendant would have 
introduced the same evidence, his right to a jury determination 
of his sanity precludes this court from determining that issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred. 
App~llant 's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
21, 1962. Traynor, J., Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
